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Since its establishment in 1977, the Cambridge Journal of Economics has been a ground-breaker in the publication 
of historical, theoretical, empirical and policy-oriented papers on alternative forms of industrial organization. 
Important among these are local and regional productive systems. Although there is now a wide and multi-
disciplinary literature focusing on how to analyse and explain such systems – aside from Alfred Marshall’s 
pioneering work on the English industrial districts of the 19th and 20th century – contemporary mainstream 
economics has largely ignored them (Schmitz 1999, p. 468).1  
However, the re-discovery of the industrial district by Italian scholars during the 1970s revived interest in Marshall’s 
notion of localized productive systems, so much so that they have been described as ‘Marshallian’ industrial 
districts. Their success in securing inter-firm co-operation and channelling competitive forces towards such 
constructive ends as quality upgrading and technological progress brought them to the attention of the international 
research community. However, the success of this form of industrial organisation presents a challenge to the 
orthodox economic view that co-operation represents an attempt to distort prices and is therefore inefficient. It also 
challenges the dichotomy between the ‘firm’ and the ‘market’. This invites a reconsideration of the role of co-
operation in production, the relationship between the organization of production and markets, and the nature and 
functioning of productive systems.  
To commemorate the Cambridge Journal of Economics’ 40th anniversary year, this paper traces these themes in the 
development of economic thought, with particular reference to the relevant contributions that have appeared in the 
journal since the publication of its inaugural issue, in March 1977. 
Co-operation and the Organization of Production 
Hodgskin (2013 [1825]) was among the first to recognise the importance of co-operation and joint labour in 
production. But he found that ‘there is no principle or rule, as far as I know, for dividing the produce of joint labour 
among the different individuals who concur in production’ (p. 40). Mainstream economics gets around this problem 
by arguing that factors of production are substitutes for each other. It is therefore assumed that, confronted with 
production techniques composed of different amounts of labour and capital, the choice is determined on the basis of 
relative price. The problem of distribution is solved by assuming diminishing marginal rates of substitution between 
factors; but nothing is said about the nature of the relationship between the factors of production once the technique 
has been chosen and production is underway.  
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, an early critic of Adam Smith’s analysis of the division of labour, emphasised the co-
operative nature of production. In his editorial notes to the Wealth of Nations, Wakefield (1835) argued that:  
‘Co-operation appears to be of two distinct kinds: first, such co-operation as takes place when several 
persons help each other in the same employment; secondly, such co-operation as takes place when 
several persons help each other with different employments. These may be termed simple co-
operation, and complex co-operation’ (p. 26). 
Wakefield was drawing attention to the fact that in each stage of production, labour, equipment and material work in 
combination. None can operate without the others so that the failure of any to adequately perform its productive 
                     
1 The exception is Krugman (1991; 1995), who has attempted to bring economic geography into mainstream economics. 
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functions lowers the joint product of the whole.2 Wakefield was also drawing attention to the importance of the 
organisational and institutional framework for securing co-operation.   
Marx followed Wakefield in explicitly recognising the importance of co-operation in his theories of the labour 
process and of surplus value (Marx, 1974 [1887], Chapters. XIII to XV).  He argued that co-operation in production 
originates when capitalist employers  bring workers together in workshops under their command. In Marx’s analysis, 
the managerial plan co-ordinates production within the factory prior to the often chaotic and wasteful co-ordination 
of supply and demand by the market (Pagano, 1985).   
Marshall similarly acknowledged the importance of co-operation in production in the sense that Marx used it;3 but 
he did not ‘consider all the implications of this argument' (Marshall, 1920, p. 72). Marshall placed strong emphasis 
on the need for more sophisticated forms of co-ordination as the division of labour progressed; and he paid close 
attention to the role of organisation in the co-ordination of the increasingly specialised and mutually dependent 
productive activities of labour and machines (ibid., Book IV, Ch.VIII).  
Productive Systems 
The productive systems approach – first presented in Wilkinson’s (1983) article in the Cambridge Journal of 
Economics’ memorial issue to Joan Robinson – is rooted in Marxian and Marshallian understandings of the 
nature of production. It evolved as a framework for analysing the implications of mutual and conflicting interest 
inherent to production and industrial organization.4 The focus of attention is the effective use of resources, and 
the role of industrial organization in securing these objectives.  Its starting point is the recognition that the 
essence of production is the mutual dependence, rooted in technical complementarities inherent to production.  
The exploitation of these dependencies requires full co-operation between those involved in production, and this 
includes a sharing of information necessary for the improvement of production, products and processes. Co-
operation also fuels the learning processes by which information and knowledge are created, incorporated and 
diffused, and which develops new products, processes and organisational forms.  The resulting operational and 
dynamic efficiencies are crucial determinants of the ability of productive systems to compete effectively, and to 
respond flexibly to changing circumstances and new opportunities. These efficiencies are also important 
because they generate the value added by the productive system, which forms the income and economic security 
for the productive system’s stakeholders. 
The concept of productive systems has general application and provides a basis for analysis at any level — 
production units, firms and industries; industrial districts, regions and countries; trading blocks and the global 
economy.  At each level, there are internal and external networks of mutually dependent relationships. The 
terms and conditions for these are settled by the interplay of the strength each party derives from their position 
within the relationship, and the strength each brings to the relationship by dint of their wealth, social, political 
and legal standing, and other means by which relative power is determined. Essentially, each productive system, 
its internal relations, those it forms with other productive systems, and the terms and conditions for their 
formation and continuance, are the unique outcome of its own history. 
The evolution of a productive system is a dialectical process in which economic and institutional elements 
dynamically interact in historical time. Change is generated by developments in products and processes, and by 
changes in productive and power relationships both within and between productive systems. These interact with 
the broader economic, social and political framework; and both are modified in the process. Such forces can 
lead to the destruction or radical modification of productive systems.  What is implied is an evolutionary process 
determined by the way productive systems, and their relations with other productive systems, create their own 
environment and mutate in response to innovation in techniques and organizational forms as well as shifting 
power balances.  
Markets, Power and Industrial Organization  
In liberal economics, the theoretical position on power in the market ranges from the static neo-classical view in 
which it is neutralised by the market or by organisational authority if markets should fail, to the more dynamic 
notion that the command by entrepreneurs over resources and their deployment in the market empowers 
entrepreneurial creativity in the interest of economic progress. 
                     
2  For a more detailed discussion of this see Wilkinson, 1983 and Tarling and Wilkinson, 1987. 
3 See Marshall, 1920, pp. 71 and 72 and especially footnote 2. 
4 For the development of the productive system analytical framework see: Wilkinson, 1983; Birecree, Konzelmann and Wilkinson, 1997; 
Wilkinson, 1998; Wilkinson, 2002. 
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Liberal economics rests on the belief in economic man, that extreme individualist in whom property rights invest 
power over the assets he or she owns, and who is inherently driven by self-interest. On the other hand, the division 
of labour is regarded as the central driving force of economic progress, so that increasingly specialised individuals 
are more and more inter-dependent. The question then becomes: how can mutual dependence between inherently 
self-seeking individuals be managed so that the resources they separately own and control can be put to the most 
effective use in their common interest? Liberal economics offers two alternative solutions: the invisible hand of the 
market or the visible hand of managerial authority.  
Markets and Organization: Marshallian Industrial Districts  
Between the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of managerial authority in large organizations are 
local and regional productive systems, populated by ‘small- and medium-sized firms in a particular branch of 
industry, localized in a specific area and participating in a production system characterized by a division of 
labour between firms’ (Hirst 1999, p. 111). Alfred Marshall was the first to study these systems, which he 
identified as ‘industrial districts’ (Marshall 1920, p. 271).  
In theorizing the industrial district, Marshall identified external economies of scale and scope derived from the 
concentration of production in particular localities (ibid., p. 271). The benefits of such localization include an 
increase in the degree and specialization of skills; their diffusion throughout the community creating an 
abundant supply of appropriately qualified labour; the growth of ‘subsidiary’ trades and specialized services; 
and an expansion in the use of highly specialized machinery made possible by the combined demand of many 
firms. The concentration of firms in close geographical proximity allows all to enjoy the benefits of large-scale 
industrial production and of technical and organisational innovation which are beyond the scope of any 
individual firm. 
The importance of the localization of production within industrial districts for Marshall is that it creates an 
environment more favourable to individual success. The close proximity of firms within a particular industry 
provided opportunities for specialization and for the district as a whole to secure economies of scale and scope 
(both static and dynamic) denied to isolated individual firms because of internal restrictions on growth. Firms 
concentrate their initiative and inventiveness on what they do best and establish an environment that improves 
the overall competitiveness of the locality.5 Marshall also highlighted the importance of an ‘industrial 
atmosphere’. For Marshall: 
‘When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great 
are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near neighborhood 
to one another. The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, 
and children learn many of them unconsciously. Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions 
and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the business 
have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and 
combined with suggestions of their own; and thus becomes the source of further good ideas’ 
(ibid., p. 225). 
He added ‘[t]he broadest, and in some respects the most efficient forms of constructive co-operation are seen in 
a great industrial district where numerous specialised branches of the industry have been welded almost 
automatically into an organic whole’ (ibid., p. 599).   
However, Marshall considered individualistic initiative and free enterprise to be the drivers of economic 
progress. While collective action may foster individual success, in Marshall’s view, it risks blunting initiative 
and inhibiting competition. Thus, trade associations had a role to play in coordinating production, standardizing 
products and providing scientific and other specialized services but, lacking the profit motive, they are of second 
order importance to the individual effort of entrepreneurs. For similar reasons, public sector intervention had a 
positive although a limited role to play in industrial organization and technical progress (ibid., pp. 666-72). 
Marshall’s Evolving Thinking on Industrial Organization  
At the turn of the 20th century, Marshall was worried about the future of the British economy, which he viewed 
as ‘threatened’ by newly emerging countries, including the USA and Germany, that had industrialised later than 
                     
5 Contemporary analyses of industrial districts put greater stress than did Marshall on the collectivist and institutional basis for successful 
co-ordination. See, for example, Brusco and Sable, 1981; Brusco, 1982; Sengenberger, Loveman and Piore, 1990; and Amin and Thrift, 
1994. 
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Britain had; and in his early work on industrial organization, ‘industrial districts were the key element that, 
according to Marshall, could rescue the British economy’ (Belussi and Caldari, 2009, p. 336).  
However, Marshall also recognized that industrial districts could decline just as easily as they could prosper. Yet 
he expressed confidence in the resilience of this form of industrial organisation and the dynamism it 
engendered: 
‘Thus, although even a little obstinacy or inertia may ruin an old home of industry whose 
conditions are changing; and although the opening out of new sources of supply or new 
markets for sale may quickly overbear the strength which old districts have inherited from 
past conditions: yet history shows that a strong centre of specialized industry often attracts 
much new shrewd energy to supplement that of native origin, and it thus able to expand and 
maintain its lead’. (Marshall 1920, p. 287) 
During the 1920s, however, Britain suffered de-industrialisation and the decline of the British industrial 
districts. Whilst Marshall’s students of the ‘Old Cambridge School’6 studied this phenomenon, Marshall’s 
thinking shifted to viewing large size as the next stage in industrial evolution, with the disappearance of small 
firms being ‘inevitable’ (ibid., pp. 579-80). 
Explaining the Decline of the British Industrial Districts 
But why did the British districts decline so rapidly? Based on their reading of the work of Marshall and his 
students, Belussi and Caldari (2009) suggest that the demise of the British industrial districts was a consequence 
of the cumulative impact of: the gradual acquisition of knowledge, skills and competitive capabilities in other 
countries; superior innovation and technological development by competitors; and the conservative attitude of 
British entrepreneurs of small district factories (ibid., pp. 349-50). ‘The local industrial atmosphere degraded, 
and so did the capabilities of local firms to absorb external technical change. Industrial secrecy and cut-through 
competition took place. The automatic organization and the district division of labour were suffocated’ (ibid., p. 
354),  
Thus, somewhat contrary to the conventional wisdom of the time – that the evolutionary trajectory of industrial 
capitalism was towards large firm dominance – Belussi and Caldari (2009) conclude that the decline of the 
British industrial districts from the 1920s onwards could be explained not so much by the superior performance 
and efficiency of administrative coordination in large firms as by ‘exhaustion of the original conditions and the 
ill-conceived Victorian heredity of believing themselves technologically superior to any international 
competitor’ (ibid., p. 354). This ultimately prevented local entrepreneurs from recognising and responding 
effectively to radical changes in international competitive conditions.   
Co-operation and the ‘New Competition’: Re-discovery of the District Model 
During the 1970s and 1980s, more co-operative forms of industrial organization emerged as competitors to the 
dominant vertically integrated corporation. This ‘new competition’ (Best, 1990) originated with Italian, Japanese and 
German producers who had evolved more co-operative relationships both with their work forces and their suppliers 
than was usual in the Anglo-American productive systems. Greater motivation to co-operate on the part of 
managers, workers and suppliers resulted in high levels of operational and dynamic efficiency based on improved 
labour productivity, the more effective utilisation of equipment and materials, better quality control and the 
mobilisation of the skills and knowledge of workers and suppliers in the improvement, design and innovation of 
products, processes and the organisation of production (Howes, 1991).  
Social, Collectivist and Institutional Coordination 
Building on Marshall, ‘Neo-Marshallian’ research on industrial districts emphasises the social and cultural 
aspects of localised productive systems more than Marshall did. Emphasis is placed on the influence of 
community – defined as family and other social relationships, rules of behaviour embedded in those 
relationships, and more formal institutions such as churches and political parties – in guaranteeing standards of 
                     
6 Becattini (1990) distinguishes two Cambridge Schools of Economics. The first is the one surrounding JM Keynes and his followers, 
including, among others, Richard Kahn, Joan Robinson, Gerald Shove, Nicholas Kaldor, Austin Robinson and Pierro Sraffa. The second – 
‘the ‘Old Cambridge School’ – surrounds Alfred Marshall and his students who studied and developed research fields within industrial 
economics. These included, among others, SC Pigou, DH Robertson, Arthur Bowley, Sydney Chapman, DH MacGregor, Charles Sanger, 
CR Fay and Philip Sargent Florence. 
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behaviour which engender trust and co-operation and thereby strengthen inter-firm networks. Within industry, 
trade associations are seen as playing a central role in providing technical, financial, marketing, training and 
other services. They also represent employers in their dealings with local and central government and with 
organised labour. In turn, government establishes – by social, company and other legislation – a framework of 
standards that underpins the equitable and co-operative relationships between firms (Sengenberger, Loveman 
and Piore, 1990).  
However, according to Staber (1996), the ‘social embeddedness’ perspective is ‘silent on the content of social 
relations [and] on the mechanisms by which social structures constrain and facilitate economic action’ (p. 157). 
More recent theoretical and empirical work on production and industrial organisation – and, in particular, on 
industrial districts – offers insight into this apparent ‘gap’ in the literature on industrial districts. 
In this, Wilkinson’s productive systems framework, described above, provides a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of the role and functioning of the social relations of production; similarly, Lawson’s (1999) 
‘Competence Theory of the Region’ provides a useful framework for explaining how local productive systems 
develop capabilities as a consequence of their social relations. Taking the competence theory of the firm as his 
starting point, Lawson extends this perspective to the analysis of the regional productive system. He argues that 
within the various literatures on local and regional productive systems that have emerged to investigate the trend 
towards organizational (vertical) disintegration, there has been a convergence in focus towards what might be 
considered local and regional competences and capabilities. This convergence is upon sets of relationships that 
emerge from social interaction and exist at a different level from the practices and products they explain. These 
constitute the region’s competences or capabilities, which are ‘real factors which emerge from, and are 
reproduced through, the interaction of agents where some systems of interaction are better, more competent, at 
facilitating some kinds of outcomes than are others’ (ibid., p. 160). 
Empirical studies of the Italian experience, by Dei Ottatti (1994), Brusco (1982) and Solinas (1982) provide 
insight into how the structure and nature of social relationships within the district model operate and the way 
this influences the development and performance of the district and its constituent firms. 
Dei Ottatti’s (1994) investigation of how the development of the industrial district is financed, offers important 
insights into the way trust operates within the Italian industrial districts. Focusing on the issue of credit and the form 
it assumes in the process of the rise and development of industrial districts, she demonstrates how the social 
environment of the ideal-type industrial district resembles a ‘community’ in which relationships involve successive 
transactions that extend over a long, unspecified period of time. In this context, trust based on reputation serves as 
‘personal strategic capital’ which can be used to effect transactions carried out over an open-ended time-frame and 
requiring adjustment. She then describes how this works, providing a fascinating insight into the financing of 
productive activities within the district, much of which would otherwise be ‘invisible’ to the outsider. One form of 
finance involves inter-linking credit, by which a ‘pure entrepreneur,’ who specialises in conceiving business ideas 
and marketing final products made in the district, extends credit to a ‘subcontractor borrower’, who repays the loan 
by discounting it from the work ordered by the lender. In this context, the ‘capital of trust’ based on reputation 
owned by the subcontractor-borrower represents a strategic resource. Another form of financial intermediation 
involves banks and entrepreneurs who are trusted by bank managers. These tend to be those entrepreneurs who have 
contracts with external markets, as it is through them that the majority of local products are exported and raw 
materials imported. However, double financial intermediation also takes place when pure entrepreneurs in the 
district, who are trusted by the bank manager, are in a position to become financial intermediaries themselves. 
According to Dei Ottatti, such ‘pure entrepreneurs are in the unusual position of being at one and the same time 
entrepreneurs without a factory and lenders without money’ (Dei Ottatti 1994, p. 542). They borrow from the bank 
to lend to subcontractor borrowers. Dei Ottatti concludes that in the formation and development of the district, the 
‘capital of trust’ – more than the availability of financial capital – is the decisive factor in the external funding of 
small firms, which frequently takes ‘less visible forms’, such as inter-linking credit. ‘[I]t is relationships of trust 
between agents which make transactions such as informal credit possible. It is also thanks to the existence of such 
relationships that collateral seems to become unnecessary, even for the granting of bank credit’ (ibid., p. 543). 
From Marshall onward, the analytical focus has been on the role of industrial organisation in securing co-
operation in production, in generating new technology and in fostering high performance. Much less attention 
has been paid to the sources of conflict within productive systems, how this impacts their effectiveness and how 
they can be resolved. In this, Brusco (1982) makes a significant contribution. In his discussion of the flexibility 
of the Emilian economy, Brusco focused on industrial relations and the structure of the labour market. In the 
well-organised primary sector of larger firms, industrial relations were amiable; and although wages were 
relatively high, work practices were flexible. But trade union organisation and legal restrictions posed major 
obstacles to the ability of firms to adjust to the vagaries of supply and demand. These rigidities in the primary 
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sector were eased by spill-over of high and low demand for labour to the largely unorganised secondary sector, 
where small firms were exempt from legal restrictions on redundancies. The putting-out of work to 
neighbouring low paying regions added to the flexibility of the Emilian economy. Thus,  
‘[a major explanation for] the freer role played by market forces in Emilia and the more 
authentically capitalist character of its development as compared with other Italian regions was 
… the system’s capacity to regain the flexibility lost to the unions in the large factory by 
segmenting the productive structure and export its contradictions’ (Brusco 1982, p. 183).  
In short, within the Emilian productive system, the threats to mutual interests in the primary sector, posed by 
distributional conflicts, were offset by their displacement to Emilia’s secondary sector and to low paying regions 
outside the district. Another important determinant of social cohesion within the district was local government: 
‘There is no doubt that the efficiency of local government has raised real wages and improved the quality of life 
of Emilian workers’ (ibid., p. 182) However, Brusco explicitly acknowledged that the success of the Emilian 
model was ultimately dependent upon competitive success. Any failure of the Emilian economy to maintain its 
leading position in the product market  
‘could quickly deteriorate into a competitive scramble for orders. This, in the conditions where 
trade unions only partially control the labour market, could put downward pressure on wages, 
and cause a reduction of prosperity and a dismantling of the productive structure upon which that 
prosperity is based’ (ibid., p. 184). 
Solinas’s (1982) analysis of the structure and operation of the Carpi knitwear industry complements Brusco’s 
analysis by detailing how the structure of the Carpi labour market (as illustrated in Figure 1, below) enables ‘a 
large proportion of the work-force … [to] assure themselves “good jobs”, even within highly competitive small 
firms where union representation is minimal and government legislation is frequently avoided’ (Solinas 1982, p. 
350). The structure of the labour market provides career mobility opportunities enabling unskilled and semi-
skilled workers to move from small subcontracting firms to large firms, in which they acquire skills and work 
experience that can be used to start-up their own small firms. Solinas also highlights benefits resulting from 
features of the industrial district that protect workers from the exploitation of monopolistic power by final goods 
producers; the high level of competition for appropriately skilled workers within the district; the subordination 
of firms and workers in regions outside of Carpi’s industrial district; and full employment stemming from 
competitive success in national and international product markets. This reinforces Brusco’s analysis, particularly 
with respect to the central role played by labour market segmentation and competitive success in protecting 
social cohesion and living standards within the industrial district. 
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Schmitz (1999) builds upon Marshall’s analysis to develop a theoretical framework for exploring how clustering 
– used interchangeably with industrial district – furthers competitiveness and growth, not only in advanced 
economies but also in developing countries. Whilst agreeing with Marshall’s contention that local external 
economies are important determinants of the success of industrial districts, Schmitz (1999) argues that they are 
not sufficient to explain the strength of clustering firms. He suggests that what is missing from the Marshallian 
explanation are: (1) consciously pursued joint action;7 (2) increasing returns to scale; (3) enabling and disabling 
external economies (pecuniary and technological); (4) enabling and disabling joint actions on the part of private 
self-help organizations and public policy; and (5) the breaking-down of investments (in finance and human 
resources) into ‘riskable steps’ to create possibilities for the accumulation of capital and skills. He concludes 
that whilst recent research on industrial clusters in advanced and developing countries attests to the importance 
of external economies (which are incidental) and consciously pursued joint action as factors explaining growth 
and competitiveness, they can usefully be brought together in the concept of ‘collective efficiency’.  
Collective Learning 
During the 1990s, contributions drawing upon earlier literature on the Italian industrial districts broadened out to 
create what Martin and Sunley (2003) have described as a sometimes ‘chaotic’ debate on the role of clusters, 
learning regions and innovative milieu in generating economic growth (Cooke and Morgan 1993; Camagni 
1991). In this, the literature on Italian industrial districts conceptualises innovation as a social process in which 
the systematic exchange and enhancement of knowledge among district firms plays a central role (Bellandi 
2007).  
In this context, Patrucco’s (2005) examination of the Emilian plastics district makes an important contribution. 
Examining the way in which interdependencies among industrial, institutional, technological and regional 
factors, both at the same point in time and across time, account for the generation and diffusion of localized 
technological knowledge and the emergence of technological systems, Patrucco demonstrates the complexity of 
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the evolution of technology systems in which collective learning processes play a key role. He finds that the 
systemic production and distribution of localized technological knowledge is the result of the co-evolution of 
interactive behaviour and collective learning at the industrial, institutional and technological levels. In this 
context, collective learning is based on the entry dynamic of small firms based on start-ups and spin-offs; user-
producer relations; institutional communications of R&D-based knowledge; and inter-industrial provision of 
artifacts, technologies and services. The crucial institutional arrangement for the governance of knowledge 
production and distribution is the co-evolution of specific sets of economic and social interactions. 
Analysing the structure and development of the Italian industrial districts, Belussi (1999) focuses on the 
supportive role played by industrial policies within the ‘spontaneous’ workings of the market, with the aim of 
proposing a conceptual framework for policy formulation that emphasises collective learning. Taking an 
evolutionary institutional approach in which competition is a process of discovery and ‘the driving force of the 
system … [that] must be enacted by markets and by dynamic entrepreneurs’ (Belussi 1999, p. 739), she argues 
that there are no institutions or policies that can be expected to have general application. The positive influence 
of institutions and policies depends upon the presence of strategic actors, capable of recognising and responding 
effectively to market signals. Belussi’s ‘central claim … is that institutions can set the rules, channel and 
mobilize knowledge and increase the transferability of knowledge from one individual to another. But they 
cannot re-create or develop markets if they lack productive capacity’ (ibid., p. 739) Local institutions are 
endogenous and serve as ‘external actors in the market’ (ibid., p. 739). She proceeds to argue that both markets 
and institutions play a crucial role in the development and implementation of policies aimed at the accumulation 
and mobilisation of knowledge and support for processes of collective learning. 
Evolutionary Paths and District Life Cycles 
Building on Marshall’s evolutionary perspective – and his recognition of the vulnerability of the industrial 
district model to decline – contemporary scholars have studied the evolution and ‘life-cycle’ of localised 
productive systems.8 These contributions aim to explain how vibrant local economic systems might emerge and 
the manner in which their original dynamism may eventually be eroded. In this, as evident in contributions by 
Dei Ottatti (2003 and 2014), Rammazotti (2010), Cusamo et al 2015) and Cowling and Tomlinson (2011), an 
important focus is the changing institutional environment as well as the economic context (local, national and 
international) in which the evolution of the district takes place.  
To make sense of the evolution of the Prato industrial district since the end of the Second World War, Dei 
Ottatti (2003) applies Albert Hirschman’s ‘Exit-Voice’ model for analysing responses to challenges confronting 
district firms, institutions and local government. Cognisant of the central importance of social cohesion and 
economic performance for district vitality, her objective is to identify the various and changing mechanisms that 
‘facilitate [their] preservation and renewal over time’ (Dei Ottatti 2003, p. 502). She finds that formation of the 
Prato district was the joint outcome of both massive ‘exit’ from employment in larger Prato mills (that had 
become unprofitable due to the loss of export markets following the war) to self-employment’ and the activation 
of individual ‘voice’ in substitution for collective voice. In this context, political action and local government 
played a central role in creating the social and institutional environment for the expression of ‘voice’ in its 
various and changing forms. During the 1950s and 1960s, with growth in demand for textiles from industrialised 
countries, the district prospered. However, as a consequence of shifts in consumer demand, the introduction of 
automated technologies and the emergence of low cost/price international competition, the Prato district faced a 
deep crisis during the mid-1980s that triggered a process of general industrial restructuring. The response was 
deliberate concerted action – involving unions, local artisans’ associations and industrialists’ associations – 
aimed at governing the massive resulting exit of workers. This reinforced social cohesion and district revival 
and facilitated the rapid implementation of the required changes in both processes and products. In assessing the 
long-term evolution of the Prato district, Dei Ottatti concludes that ‘the role of deliberate intervention [i.e., 
‘voice’] is of considerable importance because it helps give a direction to the evolutionary process, as it enables 
the latter to achieve a genuine development of the potential contained in the system’ (ibid., p. 518). The 
district’s competitive advantage thus depends upon the joint operation of market mechanisms (i.e., extensive 
availability of ‘exit’) and deliberate or semi-deliberate human action (i.e., the spread of individual and collective 
‘voice’ by virtue of a complex system of formal and informal institutions that facilitate communication among 
individuals and groups). She also finds that political action is centrally important in the creation and 
reinforcement of a sense of identity and commitment to local development, stimulation of institutional 
innovation and facilitation of the expression of new forms of ‘voice’ as the district evolves. 
                     
8 For studies of the evolutionary path of localized productive systems, see, for example, Scott 1998 and Enright 1998. For studies of district 
‘life-cycles’, see, for example, Swann 1998. 
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Ramazzotti (2010) demonstrates how quite the opposite dynamic is possible. He reminds us of Beccattini’s 
insight that the economic and social vitality of industrial districts depends upon the interaction between two 
major subsystems: a community of people and a population of firms (Becattini 1990, p. 38). In this context, 
social cohesion is of central importance as both ‘a condition for and a consequence of the vitality of the district’ 
(Ramazzotti, 2010, p. 959). But social cohesion is dependent upon both trust and confidence about the future of 
the industrial district and its constituent people and firms. It is therefore vulnerable to the consequences – for 
people and firms – associated with responses to both internal and external challenges. To demonstrate this 
dynamic, Ramazzotti describes how, from the mid-1980s, confronted with the challenges associated with 
increased competition from less industrialized countries, technological change (especially information and 
communication technologies) and restrictive macroeconomic policies (and a resulting lower level of effective 
demand), many Italian industrial districts pursued ‘low road’ approaches to restructuring. This disrupted social 
cohesion, which, in turn, put strain on the ability of districts to deliver the economic and social benefits required 
to restore trust and confidence in the future. It also undermined vitality both by causing internal rivalry (within 
firms and within the value chain) and by weakening the unifying forces derived from external rivalry (between 
the industrial district and other areas). However, because ‘[a]n industrial district is a sub-system of a market 
system, which itself is a sub-system of a political system’ (ibid., p. 970), reversing this degenerative cycle will 
require appropriate public action, such as the implementation and enforcement of laws protecting health and 
safely and prohibiting irregular and precarious employment within the district.  
Under pressure from globalisation, the institutional frameworks that underpin industrial districts and other co-
operative forms of industrial organization are being severely tested. Dei Ottatti (2014) provides an interesting 
analysis of the case of the Chinese in the Prato textile district, and the possible consequences for the future of 
Prato in the new global economy. Whilst the Chinese district in Prato appears to have much in common with the 
Italian industrial districts, it also has some significant differences. Important in this respect is the density of 
social and economic relations with family members and friends who have remained in mainland China or 
emigrated to other countries; and due to modern technology and globalization, the local productive system has a 
transnational dimension. When Chinese immigrants first arrived during the early 1990s, Prato provided a 
favourable context. There was a shortage of local homeworkers and subcontractors for the sewing of knitwear 
items; and the Chinese had basic homeworking skills (such as how to use a sewing machine), a modest amount 
of money (to purchase a few second hand sewing machines) and labour from family members or friends. 
However, a little more than a decade later, the Prato textile industry suffered an unprecedented crisis as a surge 
in cheap Chinese imports (following China’s accession into the WTO in 2001) coincided with the phasing-out 
of the transitional quota system of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2004. As the crisis deepened, the 
Chinese were increasingly viewed with resentment – and as persons who, in their quest for economic success, 
did not hesitate to violate host country norms, such as hiring co-ethnic, illegal immigrants and operating an 
illegal underground shadow economy. Dei Ottatti concludes that although the future is by no means clear, if it is 
to be a prosperous one for the people of Prato, including its Chinese immigrants, it cannot be left to the 
operation of market forces. Instead, it requires deliberate action on the part of the populations involved to create 
or evolve institutions capable of broadening Prato’s socio-economic system, integrating differences within itself 
and extending its relationships beyond mere geographic proximity. 
Cusamo et al (2015) make a valuable contribution to the literature on the evolution of industrial districts as it 
relates to the process of spin-offs and cluster life cycles. To shed light on spin-off dynamics and their 
contribution to the process of agglomeration and firm performance, Cusamo et al (2015) examine the evolution 
– the emergence and success – of the Sassuolo tile district. This is in the light of the new literature on the 
‘cluster life cycle’ (Boschma & Fornhal 2011), based on studies of the spin-off dynamics in the USA, that 
contends that instead of regional culture, local institutions and external economies, the process of agglomeration 
is largely driven by spin-offs. This literature goes further to argue that the success of localised productive 
systems can be explained by the success of the spin-offs created within them.9 Assessing the degree to which the 
Marshallian explanation of the emergence and performance of industrial districts stands-up to these newer 
theoretical arguments, Cusamo et al (2005) conclude that:  
‘in the case of Sassuolo, it appears that being a spin-off, directly inheriting competencies, 
routines and relations from experienced parents, does not provide a privileged condition for 
taking advantage of district externalities. The district economic and social milieu provides 
relevant knowledge about market opportunities and access to resources that can benefit a 
broader group of would-be entrepreneurs. Hence, in line with established district literature, 
our analysis suggests that although leading firms can impact on the local system dynamics 
through spin-offs, the entrepreneurial process is largely influenced by context specific factors 
                     
9 See, for example, Klepper 2007, 2009 and 2010; Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Boschma and Wenting 2004; and Buenstorf and Klepper 2010. 
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or Marshallian externalities, such as knowledge spillovers and the supply of ‘collective 
goods’ at the territorial level’ (p. 63). 
These findings therefore lend support to Marshall’s original conceptualization of the dynamics of the industrial 
district, the importance of local institutions and the centrality of repeated interactions between small firms 
within the district benefitting from external economies. 
In considering the issue of industrial strategy and policy, Cowling and Tomlinson (2011), argue for a regional 
and local focus; and they echo Ramazzotti’s (2010) conclusion that in this context, a ‘high road’ approach has 
the potential to generate virtuous cumulative effects. By focusing their analysis on economic governance (rather 
than institutions), they note that in the now wide literature on regional innovation systems, the governance issue 
– and the role of trans-national corporations (TNCs) – are largely ignored. However, because asymmetric 
economic power between TNCs and small firm networks put the latter at a considerable disadvantage, Cowling 
and Tomlinson conclude that ‘[t]he long-run efficacy of industrial strategy depends upon appropriate economic 
governance structures that facilitate wider stakeholder engagement and better serve the public interest’ (Cowling 
and Tomlinson 2011, p. 847) In their view, ‘[w]ider public interests are likely to be better served through an 
inclusive approach where governance structures are relatively diffuse and allow opportunities for all 
stakeholders to participate in the development process … based on non-hierarchical modes of production’ (ibid., 
p. 847). 
At present, industrial districts are evolving in response to challenges associated with globalisation and the dramatic 
acceleration in the pace and volatility of change in products, technologies and markets. But despite these 
challenges, Zeitlin (2008) sees evidence of the continuing resilience of the district form of industrial organization. 
Echoing conclusions of many of the contributions in the CJE, described above, in Zeitlin’s view, 
‘[f]lourishing industrial districts require a complex and variable ensemble of regulatory 
institutions for the provision of common services and the resolution of internal conflicts, 
together with strong local interest organizations capable of internalizing the costs and benefits of 
such collective goods.’ (ibid., p. 112) 
He goes on to argue that, from a strategic and policy perspective, their future will depend upon a bottom-up 
approach, involving:  
‘social and political leadership in which establishing a dialogue and building consensus among 
local interests becomes inseparable from analysing the weakness of the regional economy and 
constructing effective institutional solutions … A final indispensable requirement … concerns 
local government autonomy. Only local authorities are in a position to acquire the detailed 
knowledge of the local economy and broker the social consensus among local actors needed for 
the effective provision of collective services and the creation of an ‘industrial public sphere’ (ibid., 
p. 112). 
Conclusions 
During the late 19th century, based on his study of the British industrial districts of the time, Marshall developed 
powerful insights into the forces that lay behind the emergence, development and vitality of local and regional 
productive systems, in which the balance between co-operation – within and between district firms – and 
competition is an important determinant of the success of both the district and its constituent small firms. Marshall 
was interested in understanding the sources of vitality of such systems, in the face of market and technological 
forces that in other contexts tended to encourage the growth and vertical integration of large-scale producers. His 
key insight was that external economies of scale and scope – in marketing, labour, the supply of inputs, etc. – could 
be realised by groups of small firms ‘welded almost automatically into an organic whole’ (Marshall 1920, p. 599). 
Marshall also highlighted the importance of an ‘industrial atmosphere’ and social aspects of district development. 
But his principle concern was with the economic ones. Thus, he left only glimpses that more recent, Neo-
Marshallian scholars have built-upon and developed further. 
The re-discovery of the industrial district by Italian scholars, including Sebastiano Brusco and Giacomo Beccattini, 
some 50 years later coincides with the establishment of the Cambridge Journal of Economics. During the forty 
years since, the journal has published important historical, theoretical, empirical and policy-oriented contributions 
to our understanding of industrial organization in general, and the district form in particular. These are included in 
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